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While many people like to think of terrorists as irrational fanatics, research has 
shown this to be inaccurate for most individual terrorists1 and especially for the terrorist 
group as a whole.2  As rational organizations, terrorist groups operate in environments 
containing various incentives and constraints, and must calculate their actions 
accordingly if they are to be successful.  Could their actions be too violent?  Or not 
violent enough?  What level of violence is rational for terrorists to use?  How much is too 
much and how much is too little?  What happens if they use “too much” or “too little” 
violence?  Also, how can the state manipulate the rationality of terrorist violence to make 
it less rational for the terrorists?  This paper explores these and other questions by 
attempting to think more systematically about the various consequences of different 
levels of terrorist violence – consequences for the state, the population, and the terrorists 
themselves.  This is not a theoretical paper trying to explain why terrorists choose or 
execute a particular level of violence; rather, it is a heuristic model that tries to capture all 
the possible nuances, permutations, and consequences of various levels of terrorist 
violence.  In this way it is more of a theory of how terrorism is socially constructed by 
the population of the state and how the “rationality” of particular levels of terrorist 
violence and the social construction of what these levels of violence mean changes over 
time as populations adapt (or not) to living in a world of terror.
At the most fundamental level, terrorism is the gap between the actual level of 
violence and the level of violence that the population accepts (Figure 1).  
1 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, citing Jerold Post’s research.









This “accepted” level of violence refers to the amount of violence that a population will 
tolerate before it demands that the government “do something” to stop it.  Of course, any 
population will desire that the level of violence is at zero, but they will usually tolerate 
some low level of violence (and maybe only a small amount above zero) before they 
insist that the government changes its behavior, strategies, or policies to mitigate the 
violence.  For example, a few minor attacks per year by a group that result in a handful of 








This is because, even though the “actual” level of violence is higher than zero, it does not 
exceed the level of “accepted” violence and so does not invoke the psychological 
condition of terror.  This situation occurred in Canada during the 1960s when the Front 
du Liberation de Quebec conducted some minor attacks that resulted in a few injuries and 
a handful of accidental deaths.3  While the Canadian government responded to these 
attacks by investigating and imprisoning many FLQ members, the attacks were not 
severe enough to cause the population to demand that the state rethink its strategies, 
policies, organizational design, etc.  
In contrast, when terrorists groups execute a level of violence that exceeds the 
population’s accepted level of violence, they create the condition of terror that they are 
trying to achieve (Figure 1 again).  Importantly, the greater the gap between the actual 
3 Michael Freeman, Freedom or Security, Praeger: 2003, p. 118.
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and accepted levels of violence, the greater the terror created by the violence.  Clearly, 
the 9/11 attacks created a level of violence that far exceeded what the population of the 
United States found acceptable.  Because the gap between the actual and acceptable 
levels was so wide, the amount of terror was correspondingly large.  As a result, the 
government of the United States government altered and enhanced its strategies, focus, 
distribution of resources, organizational structures, and official rhetoric (read: the “global 
war on terror”) to combat terrorism.  Similarly, when the FLQ escalated its level of 
violence in 1970 by kidnapping two officials, this raised their level of actual violence 
above the population’s level of accepted violence.  As a result, the Canadian government 
responded more vigorously, used emergency powers (the War Measures Act), and 
brought in the military to provide security in Montreal and Quebec.4
One of the central dynamics to this paper is that, over time, people might get used 
to terrorism (Figure 3).  










This is based on the observation that people sometimes adapt to their surroundings and 
revise their expectations according to events. (ADD PYSCHOLOGY LITERATURE) 
When faced with a continuous campaign of terrorism violence, populations may start to 
revise their expectations of what is “normal.”  This seems to be the case in countries like 
Israel, Northern Ireland, Colombia, Iraq, and others, where populations expectations of 
terrorist violence has changed over time.  As the scholar Ian Raeder notes, “the explosion 
of bombs is something we (at least in the UK, because of recurrent IRA bombing 
campaigns of past decades) have become used to.”5  This “getting used to it” also seems 
to be happening in terms of how Americans view the numbers of casualties in Iraq. 
According to a Pew Research Center report, the American public has become less aware 
5 Ian Reader, “Spectres and Shadows: Aum Shinrikyo and the Road to Megiddo,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence (2002), 14:1, p. 155.
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of casualties in Iraq and less accurate in estimating the total number deaths.  For the first 
4 years of the war, the American public estimated the number of troop deaths correctly 
about 50% of the time.  In the spring of 2008, only 28% of Americans polled correctly 
estimated the number of casualties.  Although the rate of casualties remained relatively 
constant, the media coverage and the population’s attention to the war began to wane.6 
To put it simply again, people become inured to the violence.  What this means on the 
figure above is that over time, faced with a continuous campaign of terrorism, the 
accepted level of violence by the population will rise as they get used to terrorism.  Once 
again, this does not mean that the population wants more violence, just that the amount of 
violence required to create a condition of terror is higher.  Because the population 
becomes used to violence, the gap between the actual and accepted levels of violence will 
shrink and the amount of terror (which is the size of this gap) will correspondingly shrink 
as well.  Over time, then, terrorist violence actually loses its effectiveness.  If it terrorizes 
the population less, the terrorist group will be less likely to be able to coerce the state in 
the way that it desires.  This is the “optimistic” scenario: that terrorism has a limited 
lifespan of effectiveness, or something of a chemical half-life.  Eventually, it is possible 
that the population’s accepted level of violence may even exceed the actual level of 
violence.  When this occurs, acts of violence no longer have the capacity to terrorize the 
population.  Actual terrorist-executed violence may be at a higher level, but the amount 
of psychological terror generated by it may still be low or even zero.  This could then 
lead to the terrorist group abandoning its strategy of terror.
While this dynamic – of the declining ability of violence to terrorize – is the most 
optimistic possibility, the problem is that terrorist groups may recognize that this 
6 Joseph Girodono, “Study: Public is less aware of Iraq casualties,” Stars and Stripes, March 14, 2008, p. 4.
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dynamic is occurring and react accordingly.  In other words, this dynamic creates 
pressure and incentives on terrorists groups to escalate their level of violence if they want 
to continue to create terror with their violence.  This pressure for escalation was seen by 
al-Qaeda’s desire to follow up the 9/11 attacks with a bigger subsequent attack.  When al-
Qaeda developed a plan to attack New York City subways with cyanide, al-Zawahari 
apparently called off the attacks because they were not sufficiently escalatory; they 
“would be viewed as a pale, even humiliating, follow-up to the 9/11 attacks.”7  Whether 
or not the terrorist group in fact raises the level of violence depends on several factors: its 
own recognition of the declining capacity of violence to terrorize; the existence of some 
latent capacity that the terrorist group can mobilize for violence; and the desire to do so 










7 Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “U.S. Adapts Cold-War Idea to Fight Terrorists,” New York Times, 
March 18, 2008.
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If the group does have the desire and capacity, then the terrorist group will escalate its 
level of violence.  If the terrorist group lacks the desire or capacity to escalate, it would 
continue (more or less) at the previous level of violence (Figure 3).  
Just because the terrorist group sees the need to escalate, can it?  Some groups 
may be operating at 100% capacity, while others may have latent capacity to exploit 
because they are operating at less than the full capacity of what they could be doing.  If a 
terrorist group does escalate, it may mobilize unused or under-utilized resources, but it 
may run into a ceiling of how much violence it can execute as it approaches 100% 
efficiency.  When this is the case (Figure 5), there may be a temporary surge in terrorist 
violence, but as the population’s acceptance level continues to rise, the terrorists might be 










Over time again, terrorist violence will become less rational and terrorists may give up 
violence altogether if they realize this.  
Another possibility is that terrorists may unilaterally decide to curtail much of 










Faced with the decreasing effectiveness of their violence, a unilateral cease fire may be 
used to get the population to be less acceptant or less used to terrorism.  In effect, a 
terrorist cease-fire would result in the population’s level of accepted violence dropping 
back down so that future attacks can be more effective at “re-terrorizing” the population. 
Another possibility is that terrorist groups can continue to escalate their level of 










Beyond mobilizing latent or unused capacity, they may also be able to acquire new 
resources.  They can recruit more members, raise more money, buy more weapons, etc. to 
be able to continually escalate the level of violence.  This, in fact, is the “pessimistic” 
scenario – that the level of terrorist violence will get worse over time as terrorists keep 
raising the level of their violence to maintain the gap of terror over the population’s 
accepted level of violence. 
At this point, though, there may be an additional variable or factor that comes into 
play.  While terrorists have incentives to maintain a level of actual violence higher than 
what the population expects, they may also have upper bounds to how much violence 
they can perpetrate because they must take into account what their own constituency of 










Many people think of terrorists as having no upper constraints on their use of violence; 
they will use as much violence as they can whenever they can.  In fact, though, they have 
to maintain their legitimacy among their supporters.  If the actual level of violence 
exceeds what their own supporters will accept, their supporters will turn away from the 
terrorists.  As Giraldo and Trinkunas argue, “socially embedded groups have usually 
proved to be less likely to engage in behavior that their support group finds unacceptable 
– or if they do engage in such behavior, they risk extinction.”8  This is an important 
constraint on terrorist action and we see numerous examples of when terrorist groups 
cross this upper ceiling.  The Omagh bombing in Northern Ireland in 1998, for example, 
went a long way towards discrediting the Real IRA.  The high casualties from this attack 
8 Jeanne Giraldo and Harold Trinkunas, “The Political Economy of Terrorism Financing,” in Terrorism 
Financing and State Responses, Giraldo and Trinkunas, eds., p. 14.  They also note that, in some situations, 
the competition among terrorist groups for supporters may mean that the supporters may accept more 
violence than the terrorist group and will push them to escalate their violence.  
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(29 killed, over 200 wounded) cost the Real IRA much of its support and encouraged 
those like Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA who were seeking a more peaceful or 
political solution.9  Likewise, when Aum Shinrikyo conducted their 1995 Tokyo subway 
attack with sarin gas, many of their supporters, even including many of their own cult 
members, felt that Aum had crossed the line of what was acceptable and then abandoned 
the organization.10  As a final example, when the two independent FLQ cells in Quebec 
kidnapped two hostages in 1970, they initially enjoyed widespread support, but when one 
of the cells killed their hostage, Pierre Laporte, public sympathy evaporated.11  After the 
1970 crisis ended, the FLQ was never able to mobilize sympathizers in the same way.12 
A terrorist group in tune with its supporters will try to avoid crossing this line. 
According to some thinking in the U.S. government, for example, “if the seeds of doubt 
can be planted in the mind of Al Qaeda’s strategic leadership that an attack would be 
viewed as a shameful murder of innocents…then the order may not be given.”13  
In essence, terrorists must operate in the gap between the population’s level of 
accepted violence and their sympathizers’ level of accepted violence.  These two lines 
provide the lower and upper bounds on the level of violence that will be rational for 
terrorists to use.  Too little and the violence will not terrorize; too much and they will lose 
the backing of their own supporters.  Also, working within these boundaries, terrorist 
would want to be as high in this gap as possible to create as much terror with their 
violence that they can.
9 Wikipedia entry for “Omagh.”
10 David Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, 1996, p. 286.
11 Michael Freeman, Freedom or Security, Praeger: 2003, p. 128.
12 Michael Freeman, Freedom or Security, Praeger: 2003, p. 130.
13 Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “U.S. Adapts Cold-War Idea to Fight Terrorists,” New York Times, 
March 18, 2008.
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An interesting possible dynamic may occur if the population becomes so 
accustomed or inured to violence that its accepted level rises close to or even higher than 
the sympathizers’ accepted level of violence (Figure 8 as well).  This is probably an 
unlikely scenario because we would expect that terrorist sympathizers will always be 
more tolerant of violence than the general population.  However, if this scenario were to 
materialize, it would leave no room in which the terrorists could operate.  
With the overall dynamics described above creating incentives for ever increasing 
levels of violence, where would the level of violence associated with weapons of mass 
destruction be?  On the graphic, WMD is represented as a bracket to capture the idea that 
where this is in relation to other lines depends on the particular case or terrorist group 











For many groups the WMD line would be well above what even their own supporters 
would accept.  It is hard to conceive of the supporters of the Provisional IRA ever 
accepting the level of violence associated with WMD.  Other groups, perhaps more 
apocalyptic ones like Aum Shinrikyo, have used WMD (sarin in this case) and could do 
so in the future.  Al-Qaeda’s possible acquisition and utilization of WMD has prompted 
much debate.  Most of this debate focuses on whether or not they can acquire the 
weapons and whether or not they can be deterred from using them.14  This model, 
however, points to the possibility that al-Qaeda, or any other group, may be self-deterred 
by concerns over losing the support of their constituents if they go ahead and actually use 
WMD.15  If the actual violence created by WMD is higher than a terrorist group 
sympathizers’ level of accepted violence, this may act as a constraint on their use. 
However, if the terrorist group misjudges the sympathizers’ acceptance level, they may, 
unfortunately, use WMD even without the acceptance of their supporters.  The 
subsequent loss of support will damage the terrorist organization, but would be too late to 
stop the actual use of WMD.
The various lines of violence and the dynamics and consequences of how they 
intersect have so far just been discussed in conceptual terms.  For any given country, 
though, we can begin to assign real numerical values for these lines (or at least some 
estimates of the values).  FUTURE RESEARCH ON EMPIRICS HERE. 
Another insight that comes out of this model is that while the broad dynamics 
remain the same, different countries and terrorist groups will have different values for 
these lines.  In Canada, again, the kidnapping of two individuals exceeded what the 
14 Larry Arbuckle thesis at NPS
15 Will Browne thesis at NPS
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population would accept (or so the government contended – this is debated), while the 
death of one kidnapped victim exceeded what the FLQ supporters would accept.  Israel, 
in contrast, has faced a wave of terrorism since 2000 that far exceeded the level of 
violence in Canada.  Yet the Israelis seem less “terrorized.”  This is because the 
population has come to “accept” a certain amount of violence.  To put it in the terms from 
the graph, in Canada, all three lines were relatively low.  So even two kidnappings and 
one death was enough to terrorize the population and result in a loss of constituent 
support. In Israel, all three lines were much higher, but in comparison to Canada, the 
population’s level of acceptance was much closer to the level of actual violence.  A 
similar story to that of Canada could be told about Japan, with the population’s and Aum 
members’ horror at the use of sarin.  If the United States, on the other hand, had to face 
the consistent and high level of violence seen in Iraq or Israel, most people would assume 
that that level of violence would far exceed what our population would accept.  Put 
simply, a suicide bombing a day is normal to the population of Iraq, but would create 
much more terror in the United States, at least initially.  Some of these differences across 
countries may be due to cultural issues, such as how cultures value human life, but may 
also be a result of the country’s history and its experiences with violence and death.  
Because this framework is meant as just a model for the consequences of terrorist 
violence, it simplifies many of the issues involved.  Some of these simplifications, 
though, gloss over what may be interesting dynamics.  For example, the accepted levels 
of violence by the sympathizers and by the populace are presented as aggregate measures. 
A state’s population, however, does not have some easily measurable level of accepted 
violence that holds true across all members of the state.  Even within one country, 
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different people will accept different levels of violence.  In fact, the disaggregation and 
disagreements over what a country would “accept” are central to much of the political 
debates over how to respond to terrorism.  For example, in the United States, should the 
government take any means necessary to stop every last ounce of terrorism or is the 
protection of civil liberties paramount and worth the cost of having a little more 
terrorism?  How this question is phrased and how it is answered reflect some of the 
disagreements within the United States over how much violence is “acceptable” and how 
much should be done to get it back to an acceptable level.  
This aggregation of what is acceptable to the population is also mirrored in the 
aggregation of the supporters’ level of acceptance.  They too will have disagreements 
over what constitutes an acceptable level of violence for the group they support.  These 
internal debates provide an opportunity for the state to try to delegitimize violence for 
some portions of the population and will be discussed below.
Another interesting dynamic not captured by the simplifications of the diagram is 
that different kinds of violence and different targets of violence have varying 
consequences.  As presented in the diagram, the actual level of violence is conceived as 
essentially a measure of deaths or damage caused by terrorism.  But how people die and 
who dies matters as well.  There may be a difference, for example, between the deaths of 
220 Marines in Lebanon (out of 241 total deaths) and 186 children in a school in Beslan 
(out of 334 total deaths).  Likewise, deaths resulting from the collateral damage of 
bombings are horrific, but less horrific than beheadings and deaths from torture.  Also, 
for the supporters’ level of accepted violence, who commits the act is important.  For 
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instance, terrorist groups might generate a negative backlash if they use women or 
mentally handicapped individuals as suicide bombers.      
This diagram also helps understand and contextualize much of what the 
government is and should be doing to address the threat of terrorism.  Put simply, the 
government can take actions to alter all three lines depicted in the diagram.  The goal is to 
lower both the actual violence and the sympathizers’ accepted level of violence, while 
raising the population’s level of accepted violence.  This would narrow the gap between 
the upper (sympathizers’ level) and lower (population’s level) bounds to narrow the space 
where terror can be created, while trying to lower the level of actual violence below this 
band.  
To lower the level of actual violence, the state can target terrorist networks, 
improve intelligence to stop plots, address some of terrorism’s “root causes,” protect 
potential targets, and so on.  This is all fairly well known and covers the majority of how 
most governments spend their resources.
The government can also take measures to lower the sympathizers’ level of 
accepted violence.  This can include efforts at delegitimizing their use of violence, which 
can be done through information operations, working with moderates, and highlighting 
the disagreements within the supporters as to what constitutes an acceptable amount of 
violence.   For example, the United States is working to “amplify the speeches and 
writings of prominent Islamic clerics who are renouncing terrorist violence.”16  As 
specific example, this was done by publicizing Saudi Arabia’s highest cleric’s speech that 
warned potential jihadis against joining terrorist groups and by highlighting the former 
16 Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “U.S. Adapts Cold-War Idea to Fight Terrorists,” New York Times, 
March 18, 2008.
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leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad’s renouncement of violence.17  Likewise, the U.S. 
released seized videotapes from al-Qaeda in Iraq that showed them training children for 
operations.18
To raise the population’s level of accepted violence, the government can take 
strive to get the population to get used to terrorism.  For example, statements like “we 
live in an era of terrorism,”19 “there will be more attacks,”20 this is a “long war,”21 all 
serve to persuade the population that more terrorism will occur and that they should be 
less terrorized by it.  
Terrorists, just like the state, also have incentives to try and manipulate these 
levels of violence and their desired outcomes are the opposite of the state.  They want to 
expand the space where terrorism will occur.  This means that they will try to get the 
population to not get used to terrorism, perhaps by unilaterally taking breaks from 
terrorism, or by spacing out their attacks with time for the population’s level of accepted 
violence to drop back down in between attacks.  This also means that they will try to raise 
their constituents’ levels of accepted violence.  They too will wage information 
campaigns to convince their sympathizers that higher levels of violence are acceptable.22 
Of course, they will also try to maximize their level of actual violence to create the 
highest possible amount of terror.  
17 Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “U.S. Adapts Cold-War Idea to Fight Terrorists,” New York Times, 
March 18, 2008.




21 James Carafano, “The Long War Against Terrorism,” The Heritage Foundation, September 8, 2003; 
George Bush 2006 State of the Union Speech. 
22 Institute for Defense Analysis report, “Strategic and Operational Perspectives of al Qaida and Associated 
Movements”
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In sum, the model presented in this paper is a heuristic device designed to better 
understand the consequences of terrorist violence and how the rationality of violence 
changes over time.  It is a way to understand how populations socially construct what 
different levels of violence mean.  And it is a way to understand how and why 
governments can and do manipulate the various levels of actual and accepted violence to 
make terrorist attacks less terrorizing and so less rational.
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